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Manhattan DA and Judge Are Hell-Bent on Continuing Lawfare Against Trump

The Democrat judge presiding over the sham New York criminal case against Donald Trump remains adamant that the president-elect appear for sentencing on Friday — a mere ten days before Trump takes his oath of office.

On Monday, Trump’s legal team filed a two-fold motion seeking the stay of the January 10, 2025 sentencing hearing that Judge Juan Merchan ordered to proceed in an 18-page opinion he issued on Friday. In that opinion, Judge Merchan denied the president-elect’s Motion to Vacate the Jury Verdict and Motion to Dismiss the 38-count indictment a grand jury returned against Trump related to payments made to Stormy Daniels.

Trump’s motion argued first that the proceedings against him were automatically stayed during the pendency of his forthcoming appeal related to presidential immunity. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision last term on presidential immunity, Trump’s legal team argued in Monday’s Motion to Stay that no further proceedings could take place until the issue of immunity was resolved by an appellate court.

Second, and alternatively, attorneys for the president-elect argued that even if a stay were not required under federal law, Judge Merchan should stay the proceedings under New York law.

Unsurprisingly, by day’s end on Monday, Judge Merchan had denied Trump’s request for a stay. The denial came in a perfunctory two-page order: After noting that D.A. Alvin Bragg had opposed the stay, Judge Merchan reasoned that a stay was inappropriate because Trump was merely repeating the arguments he had raised previously. The Manhattan trial judge then concluded that the precedent on which Trump relied to seek a stay was either distinguishable or inapplicable. (Read more from “Manhattan DA and Judge Are Hell-Bent on Continuing Lawfare Against Trump” HERE)

Photo credit: Gage Skidmore via Flickr

Out-of-Control Supreme Court Kills Efforts to Require Illegals to Show ID When Registering to Vote [+video]

The case, Kobach, et al. v. Election Assistance Commission, et al., was about whether Arizona and Kansas could require voters to prove their citizenship when registering to vote with the so-called federal form. Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach led the suit against the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, which was an appeal of a lower court decision.

Both Kansas and Arizona have state laws that require applicants to prove their citizenship when applying to vote with state forms (for state or federal elections). But the U.S. EAC denied the states’ requests to have their citizenship laws applied when would-be voters use the standardized federal form.

The Supreme Court had already ruled in 2013 that state proof-of-citizenship laws couldn’t be applied when people try to register with the federal form. The states’ direct request to the EAC was a last-ditch effort to get around that.

By not hearing the case, the Supreme Court effectively upheld the decision of the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled against Arizona and Kansas in November 2014, saying the EAC did not have to modify its form to meet state laws. Under the federal form, would-be voters need only swear under penalty of perjury that they are citizens.

“This is a very big deal,” University of California Irvine Law Professor Rick Hasen wrote on his election law blog Monday. “Kobach had the potential to shift more power away from the federal government in administering elections toward the states,” he added. (Read more from “Out-of-Control Supreme Court Kills Efforts to Require Illegals to Show ID When Registering to Vote” HERE)

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Revolution by Judicial Fiat

While a common view is that social conservatives have “lost” the culture war, little other result was possible due to the power of the U.S. Supreme Court. This point was made clear at a presentation at the Family Research Council on May 8, which reviewed the judicial decisions issued, political moves made, and ideological positions taken in the mid-twentieth century that led to the current collapse of marriage, morality, and the family.

William Duncan , Director of the Marriage Law Foundation (with a mission of re-affirming traditional definition of marriage as union of one man and one woman), offered one of three presentations, his focusing on the Supreme Court’s decisions which preceded its decisions on homosexuality in the 1990s and 2000s.

Duncan began by noting common judicial opinion about marriage and the family before the sexual revolution, citing a 1952 decision from the California Supreme Court in which marriage was held to be “a great deal more than a contract, ‘the family is the basic unit of our society, the center of personal affections … it channels biological drives that might otherwise become destructive, it insures the care and education of children in a stable environment, it established continuity from one generation to another.’” Although it would be the 1970s before there was a radical departure from this understanding, the 1960s saw the decisive shift that made everything that came after it possible.

Language such as that of the 1952 California decision dropped out of usage at the U.S. Supreme Court, and a new understanding of marriage and the family was foreshadowed in the 1965 Griswold vs. Connecticut decision. This decision, the result of a lawsuit by Planned Parenthood, declared a Connecticut law prohibiting artificial contraception to be unconstitutional. This was found to violate a “right of privacy” which was held to exist in a marital relationship. Although speaking favorably of marriage, Duncan noted that the Griswold decision backed away from the concept of marriage as a permanent union of man and woman, and referring to it as an “association” which would “hopefully” endure. Earlier court decisions would have referred to marriage as a “union” or an “institution,” Duncan said. In addition to downgrading the understanding of marriage from a vital union which forms “the basic unit of society,” and concerned with children, the Griswold decision strengthened the right of sexual choice, saying that the choice of a married couple to use contraception is protected by the intimate nature of marriage, and is grounded in a law “older than the Bill of Rights” (and thus presumably older than the Constitution), although it was buttressed with broad statements held to point to a right to privacy drawn from the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution. The right of privacy was thus made a constitutional doctrine, and violation of it a violation of the person, although at this point, this powerful new constitutional doctrine was kept within the marriage relationship, indeed, it was in some measure justified by being a right that pertained to marriage.

The truly radical departure from the traditional understanding of marriage and morality occurred in 1972, Duncan observed, in the Eisenstadt vs. Baird decision. This decision extended the constitutional “right of privacy,” which gave a right to use contraception, to cases of non-marital intercourse. This was done by declaring the “right of privacy” to be an individual right, not one that could be restricted to marriage. And to do that, the court deconstructed the traditional idea of marriage. The court denied that a marriage was an “independent entity, with a mind and heart of its own,” but remains the association of two individuals, a radical departure from the traditional Christian doctrine, derived from the words of Jesus, that two persons become one in the union of marriage (Matt. 19:4-6; Mk. 10:6-9). To state the obvious, giving any sort of rights or dignity or respect to non-marital intercourse, which in Christian and other traditional morality is regarded as among the gravest of sins, was a truly radical departure from the past. The decision did not directly invalidate laws against fornication or adultery, however, but the right to contraception becomes a right fundamental to personhood whether a person is married or not. Thus, Duncan claimed, the Eisenstadt decision reduced marriage and the family to “a mere lifestyle choice.” The right of sexual choice that the Eisenstadt decision introduced is “an individual right, not the right of an entity of two people who have joined together in a binding union.”

The Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions pertaining to sexual relations were shocking to a large part of the American public, but “the logic relentlessly follows from” this radical departure from the traditional understanding of marriage and morality, according to Duncan. Some of the most radical decisions of great import today quickly followed. The Roe vs. Wade and Doe vs. Bolton decisions (both issued in 1973), which established a constitutional right to abortion were based on the (now individual) right to privacy, a right to choice in child bearing the state was held to infringe upon by prohibiting abortion. In the Department of Agriculture vs. Moreno case, (also issued in 1973), the court voided a Congressional provision restricting food stamps to only those families composed of members related to one another. Nontraditional (“hippie”) families were excluded. The court did not challenge the use of families, rather than individuals, as the recipients of food stamps, but found unconstitutional the restriction of food stamps to natural families. Although use of the natural family as a criterion to receive food stamps would be very reasonable in a pre-1960s environment, both to prevent fraud and to reinforce the ideal of the natural family, the court held the law resulted from “a bare desire to harm” persons living in these non-traditional relationships. With traditional marriage and the family no longer an ideal in law due to the Eisenstadt decision, it was held that only unwarranted hostility could explain Congressional intent. This decision was crucial to decisions in recent years finding laws resisting the advance of homosexuality to be based on “impermissible animus.” Other decisions found laws requiring spousal consent to abortion to be unconstitutional, and laws which tend to inhibit access to contraceptives (including abortion) to be unconstitutional. This, Duncan said, shifted the right to abortion from a “negative right” (not to be restrained from aborting a child) to a positive right (to have access to abortion guaranteed).

The concept of marriage as nothing more than a personal expression of autonomous individuals reached an apogee in the Planned Parenthood vs. Casey decision (1992), which sustained the earlier Roe vs. Wade decision, and which infamously declared that the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution involves the right to define one’s own reality and existence. A completely unworkable principle as regards life in general, it is used by the court to protect the individual from the consequences of his or her sexual choices. Marriage becomes simply a choice of “two autonomous individuals” to engage in a joint project of “self expression and self creation.” Today’s “contraceptive mandate,” imposed by the Health and Human Services Administration as part of the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), which requires employers to pay for contraceptives and abortion inducing drugs regardless of their conscience convictions, follows the earlier issued court decisions aimed at protecting individuals from the consequences their sexual choices, Duncan noted.

It might be added to Duncan’s comments that this understanding of sexual choice as a “positive right” highlights the most disturbing aspect of the post-1960s marriage and morality jurisprudence, namely that is animated by a moral spirit which is not merely non-Christian, but really anti-Christian. By reasonably claiming that what violates marriage violates the person, and then dubiously claiming that the choice of contraception is obviously derived from that, the court made denial and punishment of sexual choice to be immoral and oppressive, an attack on the person. By extending this right outside of marriage as an individual right, a wholesale attack on Christian sexual morality was possible, since in Biblical morality, all sexual activity outside of marriage is shameful and due punishment. The court’s later (1990s and beyond) abortion and homosexuality decisions especially are notable for their tone of scolding the American public; the Casey decision implying that the public is lawless if it doesn’t accept court prescribed morality, the Romer, Lawrence and Windsor cases pertaining to homosexuality attacking the public for “irrational hate” and impermissibly enshrining Judeo-Christian morality in law. But holding sexual choice to be a matter above public decision making is a natural result of holding that any restriction on this choice is a personal attack, forbidden by a law “older than the Bill of Rights.”

Through these decisions, the Supreme Court has made itself “the ultimate arbiter of what marriage and family means, and what policies the states are allowed to pursue, and the federal government as well.” Duncan held that the true principle the Supreme Court has followed in its sex, marriage, and family decisions since the 1960s is the principle annunciated by Vladimir Lenin: “the success of the revolution is the supreme law.”

While Christians and social conservatives may lament national apostasy from God and His revelation, we need to remember that the result of the sexual revolution is only partly, and not decisively, the result of changing public beliefs and practices. The reason the sexual revolution prevailed is that it was imposed on the nation by the Supreme Court, and the inability of social conservatives over a number of years to decisively change the composition of the court. But however the sexual revolutionaries prevailed, and they did so undemocratically, it cannot change the truth of God’s revelation. For the non-religious or nominally religious, the success of the sexual revolution may be welcomed or regretted, but in any case accepted as final. But what Christians have always been involved in is not a mere political struggle, or even a cultural struggle. In those cases, there comes a time to accept defeat. Our non-negotiable commitment is to obey God, and so what we are engaged in is a religious struggle, which can therefore never be abandoned. The imposition of a sexual ethic hostile to the Biblical revelation gives believers the possibility of displaying the truth about marriage, sexuality, and the family as, Duncan concluded, “a pearl against a black background.” (See “Revolution by Judicial Fiat”, originally posted HERE)

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U.S. Supreme Court to Weigh Cell Phone Searches by Police

Photo Credit: REUTERS/JONATHAN ERNST

Photo Credit: REUTERS/JONATHAN ERNST

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed on Friday to decide whether police can search an arrested criminal suspect’s cell phone without a warrant in two cases that showcase how the courts are wrestling to keep up with rapid technological advances.

Taking up cases from California and Massachusetts arising from criminal prosecutions that used evidence obtained without a warrant, the high court will wade into how to apply older court precedent, which allows police to search items carried by a defendant at the time of arrest, to cell phones.

Cell phones have evolved from devices used exclusively to make calls into gadgets that now contain a bounty of personal information about the owner.

The legal question before the justices is whether a search for such information after a defendant is arrested violates the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which bans unreasonable searches. The outcome would determine whether prosecutors in such circumstances could submit evidence gleaned from cell phones in court.

Digital rights activists have sounded the alarm about the amount of personal data the government can now easily access, not just in the criminal context, but also in relation to national security surveillance programs.

Read more from this story HERE.

Justice Sotomayor and Murderer Advocacy

As detailed elsewhere, pro-murderer media suppression of the truth has played a major role in enabling a wholesale evisceration of capital punishment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor recently provided a graphic example, one that would be excruciatingly painful to survivors of murder victims if they knew about it. Many people unfamiliar with the practices and philosophy of the current Supreme Court would very likely be shocked to learn just what values some justices hold.

In an unreported but highly revealing dissent from the Supreme Court denial (at least temporarily – myriad appeals are endless) of further tortuous review of a claim by convicted triple-murderer Benny Lee Hodge, Sotomayor complained of his lawyer’s “deficient” attention to Hodge’s abused childhood:

[T]he court below concluded that Hodge would have been sentenced to death anyway because even if this evidence had been presented, it would not have “explained” his actions, and thus the jury would have arrived at the same result…This was error. Mitigation evidence need not, and rarely could, “explai[n]” a heinous crime; rather, mitigation evidence allows a jury to make a reasoned moral decision whether the individual defendant deserves to be executed, or to be shown mercy instead. [Emphasis added.]

Translating judicial double talk into plain English, what the justice is saying is that a crime so heinous as to be inexplicable can and should nevertheless be “mitigated.” Tell that to the surviving loved ones. Tell them that merciless barbarians deserve mercy — in the eyes of pro-murderer members of the United States Supreme Court.

Just as the media has suppressed reporting on the Sotomayor opinion, she, in turn, has suppressed key facts. First, she confines her discussion to the invasion and more than two million dollar robbery of Dr. Roscoe Acker’s home, the attempted murder of this physician, and the multiple stabbing murder of his daughter the day before she was to go back to college. (Needless to say, Dr. Acker is not deemed worthy of mention by name.) Sotomayor devotes not a single word to the fact that Hodge was separately convicted and sentenced to death for committing two prior premeditated murders — of an elderly couple). Second, having left out the fact that Hodge faces two separate death sentences rather than just the one she now protests, Sotomayor does not bother to mention that substantial “mitigation” evidence was in fact presented in the second trial only to be rejected by the jury. Third, anyone reading Sotomayor’s opinion sympathetic to this recidivist attempted murderer and triple murderer might get the impression that he had not been treated fairly or given adequate due process. Nowhere does she mention that the barbaric acts for which she wishes to minimize the punishment took place in a two-month period in 1985 — 27 years ago! Fourth, just to be clear, although Sotomayor focuses exclusively upon one of the two death sentences received by Hodge, he was convicted by two separate juries for three murders. Hence, this is yet another case that has dragged on for nearly three decades (and is likely to continue) where there is no doubt about guilt. What has been going on for a very long time now is an attempt to minimize sentences for the worst crimes; virtually all delays have little to do with guilt or innocence.

In spurning the view that any crimes could be so heinous that they could not be mitigated, Sotomayor rejects the Kentucky Supreme Court’s conclusion that severe child abuse

offered in mitigation might have explained… substance abuse, or… even a crime committed in a fit of rage…. But it offers virtually no rationale for the premeditated, cold-blooded murder and attempted murder of two innocent victims who were complete strangers to Hodge. Many, if not most, malefactors committing terribly violent and cruel murders are the subjects of terrible childhoods….

Sotomayor briefly discusses but does not appear fazed by the Kentucky Supreme Court’s findings. She writes:

The murder itself was “calculated and exceedingly cold-hearted.” …Hodge stabbed the daughter “at least ten times,” and he “coolly” told his codefendant that he knew the daughter “was dead because the knife had gone ‘all the way through her to the floor.'” …Hodge’s conduct after the murder was shocking as well: He and the two other robbers “brazenly spent the stolen money on a lavish lifestyle and luxury goods, including a Corvette,” and Hodge told a cellmate he had “sprea[d] all the money out on a bed and ha[d] sex with his girlfriend on top of it.” ….Moreover, had Hodge put on evidence in mitigation, the Commonwealth may have sought to introduce evidence of Hodge’s “long and increasingly violent criminal history, his numerous escapes from custody, and the obvious failure of several rehabilitative efforts.” [Emphasis added.]

In her zealous condescending lecture to the Kentucky Supreme Court about its “error” in “misunderst[anding]” that cruel savagery that cannot be explained can nevertheless be mitigated, Sotomayor unwittingly reveals the extent of abuse of power by her own court’s justices. “We have made clear for over 30 years,” she admonished, “that mitigation does not play so limited a role…. the sentencer in a capital case must be given a full opportunity to consider, as a mitigating factor, ‘any aspect of a defendant’s character or record’….” Sotomayor thus implicitly concedes that, for nearly two centuries previously, the court did not make that “clear” — for the obvious reason that there is not and never was such a requirement in the actual written Constitution. It was interpolated by justices who believe their power to interpret the Constitution gives them license to rewrite the Constitution to impose their own personal values on everyone else — in the absence of any constitutional amendment whatsoever. Thus, in the cause of saving brutal murderers, justices have “gone from pillar to post… completely sacfic[ing]” Constitutional predictability, as stated by Justice Rehnquist in a case cited by Sotomayor. In sum, what she says has been “clear” for over 30 years was a completely unconstitutional concoction out of thin air that had never before even existed, let alone being clear.

Sotomayor’s goal is the quest of all murderer advocates: to find “at least one juror” who could be hoodwinked (not her word) into saving the life of a barbarian who had a bad childhood (notwithstanding that most people who have suffered extreme child abuse do not commit multiple premeditated murders). Of course, the flip side of her stance is that barbaric murderers who had good or even privileged childhoods should be more harshly punished than those with unhappy childhoods. Is that “fair”? In the infamous Leopold-Loeb case, Clarence Darrow made just that point, arguing (n327) not only that his clients were being singled out for harsher punishment because of their privileged upbringing but that they actually suffered from the “curse” of wealth, itself a ground for mercy.

When pro-murderer justices seek — often successfully — to focus upon criminals rather than crimes, the result is to grant certain perpetrators greater protection against punishment for their brutality than others who commit identical or less serious acts without Supreme Court succor. The reductio ad absurdum, of course, is the Court’s fiat proclaiming a Constitutional right, nowhere to be found in the real document, for the most depraved and vicious barbarians to commit murders and rapes with no punishment at all. In the Court’s Alice in Wonderland world, “fairness” means that those with the worst records receive little or no punishment for the worst new crimes, while those with no criminal past can receive harsh punishment for far less serious transgressions.

Those steeped in the mire of Supreme Court death penalty subversion by pro-murderer justices might recall Justice’s Scalia’s complaint two decades ago that, using a “fog of confusion,” the justices had

decreed — by a sheer act of will, with no pretense of foundation in constitutional text or American tradition — that the People (as in We, the People) cannot decree the death penalty, absolutely and categorically, for any criminal act, even (presumably) genocide…. Today … the Court strikes a further blow against the People in its campaign against the death penalty.

Nothing can better illustrate the “fog of confusion” than Sotomayor’s straight-faced claim that “especially heinous” murders cannot and need not be “explained” but can and should be “mitigated.”

Although the Hodge dissent was joined by no other justice, Sotomayor is far from the only pro-murderer justice. Just last year, four justices wanted to save a barbaric murderer by brazenly applying a law they conceded was never passed and disingenuously pretended would be enacted with the support of just one legislator. Other justices, especially Kennedy, have joined this quartet.

Only in a relentless campaign to inform the public along with a highly organized opposition is there any hope of preventing more brazenly and zealously pro-murderer justices from being placed on the Supreme Court.

Sotomayor’s full opinion is here; lower court opinions are here and here.

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Lester Jackson, Ph.D., a former college Political Science teacher, views mainstream media suppression of the truth as essential to harmful judicial activism. His recent articles are collected here

Marriage and Self-Government

On Friday afternoon, the Supreme Court announced that it will hear arguments in two cases that are at the center of the same-sex-marriage controversy. One concerns the power of people in the states to govern themselves on the question, the other the complementary power of Congress to define “marriage” for purposes of federal law.

At issue in both cases is whether courts should even be hearing them, because there are knotty questions of standing (and also of what should happen to lower-court rulings if the Court rules that parties did not have standing). If the Court does reach the merits in these cases, it should find its way toward a defense of the right of republican self-government.

In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the justices will consider the constitutionality of Proposition 8, an amendment to the California constitution affirming that marriage is the union of a man and a woman. The people of the state passed it by referendum in 2008, shortly after the state supreme court ruled that the state constitution, unbeknownst to anyone until then, required official recognition of same-sex marriage. In the federal lawsuit that followed, Judge Vaughn Walker of the U.S. district court in San Francisco conducted a sort of show trial, ignoring all relevant precedents in holding that the protection of conjugal marriage rests on irrational bigotry.

This decision went too far even for a Ninth Circuit panel led by the oft-reversed Judge Stephen Reinhardt. The appeals court affirmed Judge Walker’s decision but did not imitate his reasoning, holding instead that, having recognized same-sex marriage, California could have had no rational basis for changing its mind.

The Supreme Court should reverse these lower-court rulings, and straightforwardly affirm the right of the people in any state to act, constitutionally or legislatively, to adopt the traditional view of marriage as a relationship oriented toward procreation. The justices need not themselves hold that view — they may consider it outmoded or rationally inferior to a conception of marriage that treats it first and foremost as an emotional union of adults — to see that the Constitution erects no barrier to it, and that states therefore have the freedom to act on it.

Read more from this story HERE.

SCOTUS Opens Door to New Obamacare Challenge

photo credit: onecle

It feels a bit like deja vu all over again. The Supreme Court has ordered an appeals court to reopen arguments on the Affordable Care Act’s employer mandate and contraceptive coverage provisions, opening a potential path back to the highest court by late 2013.

The case at hand is one filed Liberty University, a Christian college in Virginia. The university had filed one of the earlier suits against the health care law, which was among the dozens dismissed by the Supreme Court when it ruled the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate to be constitutional.

The Liberty University case also is unique in that it was the only one where the appeals court decided it couldn’t even make a ruling, given that the provisions it was supposed to rule on hadn’t come into effect. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Anti-Injunction Act precluded any rulings about the mandate’s constitutionality before the mandate actually took effect and individuals began paying penalties.

The Supreme Court sided against that viewpoint. In its decision, the justices said that it was within the court’s power to rule on the health law now. That leaves Liberty wanting some answers on the provisions it challenged in court. The Obama administration also agreed that these issues should go back to the Fourth Circuit. Other courts are already hearing new challenges to the health care law, too.

Liberty University doesn’t want to challenge the individual mandate; we already know what the Supreme Court thinks about that. But it does want are answers on two other provisions that it challenged: the mandate that employers provide insurance coverage and the requirement that contraceptives be covered. ”Petitioners’ remaining claims should be subject to adjudication by the lower courts,” Liberty University’s lawyers wrote in a July 2012 petition for re-hearing.

Read more from this story HERE.